Dans le présent article, nous proposons une revue de l’évolution de la conception de la schizophrénie du phénoménologue belge Marc Richir au travers des concepts d’affectivité et de dissociation (Spaltung). Notre objectif est de montrer comment ces notions trouvent leur place dans la refondation de la phénoménologie de Richir et de réfléchir à la pertinence clinique possible de ces conceptions. La Spaltung que nous thématisons dans cet article n’est pas un mode déficient de structures transcendantes ou existentielles, mais caractérise dans une certaine mesure chaque existence humaine. Et c’est paradoxalement à l’endroit de la Spaltung que Richir propose une distinction renouvelée entre le normal et le pathologique inspiré de la phénoménologie. Nous présentons une revue systématique des conceptions de Richir sur la Spaltung et la schizophrénie, depuis ses premiers travaux sur la psychopathologie à la fin des années 1980 jusqu’à ses derniers travaux présentés dans son maître-ouvrage sur les psychopathologies, Phantasia, imagination, affectivité, en 2004. La perspective de Richir offre une nouvelle compréhension de l’expérience schizophrène et de la relation thérapeutique qui peut embrasser les dimensions à la fois incarnée, intersubjective et imaginaire de l’expérience humaine. Elle pourrait ainsi constituer un dispositif heuristique fécond pour la recherche translationnelle en psychiatrie.

In the present article we propose to review the evolution of phenomenologist Marc Richir's conception of schizophrenia through the prism of affectivity and dissociation (Spaltung). Although this concept is not at all new – indeed, already Bleuler has proposed to describe the “group of schizophrenias” with this term – we can nevertheless affirm that it appears in a new light in Richir's phenomenological anthropology. Furthermore, the term of Spaltung is absent on the description of schizophrenia in the DSM-5 and reserved for the dissociative disorders. We argue that this notion can be made fruitful not only in the context of a historical analysis of these troubles, but also in the context of phenomenological psychopathology. Our aim is to show how this concept finds its place in Richir's refoundation of transcendental phenomenology and to reflect on the possible clinical relevance of his conception. This objective is related to a second one, implied by Richir's conception of schizophrenia, and namely that of showing that affective troubles associated with mental health issues should not be conceived of in terms of deficiencies. The Spaltung that we thematize in this paper is not a deficient mode of transcendental or existential structures but characterizes to some extent each and every human existence. Paradoxically, it is in the area of Spaltung that Richir proposes a renewed distinction between the normal and the pathological inspired by phenomenology.

In order to answer these questions, we present a systematic review of Richir's conceptions of Spaltung and schizophrenia from his first works on psychopathology in late 1980s to his latest work presented in his groundwork on psychopathologies Phantasia, imagination, affectivité in 2004.

We were able to identify three moments of Richir's thought: (1) Firstly Richir's understanding of psychosis is in terms of formation of sense (Sinnbildung) and symbolic institution related to the affective tonality (Stimmung) of the experience in general. He describes formation of sense as an inner division of Stimmung in normal and pathological embodied experience. (2) In the second moment, we focus on a further development of the question of affectivity in intersubjective and embodied relationship. Here Richir analyzes this archaic character in its embodied dimension and more precisely in its intersubjective circulation through what he calls the Phantasieleib, a flesh of phantasy. Through the structures of inter-corpreality, affectivity can even be contagious, pass from the intimacy of one flesh to the other, and it is precisely through this contagion-character of the affective circulation that we can also speak of a peculiar contact with the affectivity of a patient suffering from schizophrenia. (3) Lastly, we pursue the analyses of affectivity and its relation the embodiment and imaginary life by drawing on Richir's main work on psychopathology and phenomenological anthropology: Phantasia, imagination, affectivité. In this, he offers a renewed perspective on dissociation (Spaltung): between an embodied affectivity in the Phantasieleib and delusional affectivity that is not embodied, but makes up what Richir calls a Phantomleib. The Spaltung is thus a dissociation of affectivity of its original embodiment and it is characterized by an “atmopsherisation” that relates it to the pure imaginary that functions autonomously, independently of its phenomenological base in phantasy life.

These analyses show that a phenomenological approach to schizophrenia is possible without understanding this latter a deficient mode of human experience. Rather, one has to pass through the field of phenomenological anthropology and the phenomenological analysis of sense formations, phantasy, affectivity. Richir's perspective offer a new comprehensive modelisation of schizophrenic experience and therapeutic relationship that can embrasse both embodied, intersubjective and imaginary dimension of human experience. It could be thus a fruitful heuristic device for translational sciences in psychiatry.