Emergency departments (EDs) are a critical entry gate for infectious agents into hospitals. In this interdisciplinary study, we explore how infection prevention and control (IPC) architectural interventions mitigate the spread of emerging respiratory pathogens using the example of SARS-CoV-2 in a prototypical ED.

Using an agent-based approach, we integrated data on patients' and healthcare workers' (HCWs) routines and the architectural characteristics of key ED areas. We estimated the number of transmissions in the ED by modelling the interactions between and among patients and HCWs. Architectural interventions were guided towards the gradual separation of pathogen carriers, compliance with a minimum interpersonal distance, and deconcentrating airborne pathogens (higher air exchange rates (AERs)). Interventions were epidemiologically evaluated for their mitigation effects on diverse endpoints.

Simulation results indicated that higher AERs in the ED (compared with baseline) may provide a moderate level of infection mitigation (incidence rate ratio (IRR) of 0.95 (95% confidence interval (CI) 0.93–0.98)) while the overall burden decreased more when rooms in examination areas were separated (IRR of 0.78 (95% CI 0.76–0.81)) or when the size of the ED base was increased (IRR of 0.79 (95% CI 0.78–0.81)). The reduction in SARS-CoV-2-associated nosocomial transmissions was largest when architectural interventions were combined (IRR of 0.61 (95% CI 0.59–0.63)).

These modelling results highlight the importance of IPC architectural interventions; they can be devised independently of profound knowledge of an emerging pathogen, focusing on technical, constructive, and functional components. These results may inform public health decision-makers and hospital architects on how IPC architectural interventions can be optimally used in healthcare premises.