Redefining biological weapons in the evolving AI, CRISPR, and biothreat landscape - 27/09/25
Highlights |
• | The definition of the BWC has shifted since 1972 and needs to be reshaped. |
• | Challenges of Norms and opportunities might evolve into the biothreat landscape. |
• | The international Norms should take action to prevent the misuse of AI. |
• | Redefinition of BWC Map links new modern technology and Climate Change. |
Abstract |
Introduction |
In 2025, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) will turn 50 years old. Every one of the BWC’s 189 States Parties will decide whether to give the treaty its first real upgrade and make it future-proof.
Objective |
The biothreat posed by state and non-state actors has evolved with the democratization of synthetic biology and genetic engineering including clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and gain-of-function research, artificial intelligence (AI), and 3D bioprinting. Combined with algorithms applied to genomic databases, these technologies have revolutionized biological agent modification and the delivery or dissemination vectors for the biological weapon system in line with potential biowarfare objectives. Infections, outbreak-scale disasters, or large-scale health security incident scenarios are forecasted and explored by AI using global and parallel genomic databases that feed AI prediction outcomes.
Methods |
The traditional definition rooted in the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 primarily focused on microorganisms, toxins, and their means of delivery intended for hostile purposes, Article I. However, biotechnology’s rapid advancement and diffusion have blurred the lines between defensive and offensive research, creating opportunities for both state and non-state actors to develop and deploy novel bioweapons.
Results |
This paper contends that a contemporary definition of biological weapons must encompass any biological agent, technology, or knowledge with the potential to cause harm to humans, animals, or the environment when used for malicious purposes. Such a definition acknowledges the dual-use dilemma inherent in biotechnological advancements. To address these evolving threats, this paper proposes a multifaceted approach centered on strengthening international norms, fostering responsible innovation, and enhancing global collaboration and a reevaluation of the definition of biological weapons and the international frameworks designed to prevent their misuse and the lessons from the historical progress of bioweapons and bioterrorism from ancient times to the present has been studied in terms of developments in the technology and understanding of the Biothreat processes.
Conclusion |
The redefinition of biological weapons considering technical advances from different regions' committees is not purely an academic or public health exercise but an urgent imperative for defending global health and security as Framework of New Definition of Biological Weapon Map of the proposed new definition of Biological Weapon links new modern technology AI with genome database of Humans, Animals, Plant, Pathogen, environmental health, and Climate Change come in one body under combines multiple international, governmental, non-governmental organizations and, Interpol is the common challenge among those sectors Biosafety, Biosecurity, Bioethics and Cybersecurity linked with Law and Culture.
Le texte complet de cet article est disponible en PDF.Keywords : AMR, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Biothreat, Climate change, CRISPR, Database, Dual use of biosecurity, Gene editing, Health policy, One health, Synthetic biology, United Nations, Infectious diseases, UNODA, WHO
Plan
Vol 33
Article 101176- 2025 Retour au numéroBienvenue sur EM-consulte, la référence des professionnels de santé.
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